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MONTANA'S LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPT TO DEAL
WITH THE DRINKING DRIVER: THE 1983 DUI
STATUTES
Brendon J. Rohan
I. INTRODUCTION
Drinking alcohol and driving a motor vehicle is a problem of
national1 and state2 concern. In the spring of 1982, President Ron-
ald Reagan established a presidential commission to combat what
he termed an "epidemic" of drunk driving on this nation's road-
ways. 3 This commission was a catalyst, stimulating a grassroots re-
sponse to the problem of the drinking driver. A comprehensive ap-
proach, emphasizing deterring the drunk driver through
integration and coordination of enforcement, prosecution, adjudi-
cation, education, and treatment was recommended. 4 The founda-
tion of this type of program is community-based citizen support.
The ultimate goal of this effort was to change societal attitudes5
1. According to a 1978 government report, traffic accidents were the greatest cause of
violent death in the United States. Approximately one-third of the injuries and one-half of
the deaths resulting from these accidents were alcohol related. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC.,
AND WELFARE, THIRD SPECIAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 233
(1978) [hereinafter cited as ALCOHOL AND HEALTH]. In 1981, 50,000 people were killed on the
nation's highways. Drunk drivers were involved in one-half of these fatalities and were re-
sponsible for 750,000 injuries. President Establishes Commission on Drinking and Driving,
7 ALCOHOL HEALTH AND RESEARCH WORLD 2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ALCOHOL WORLD].
The economic loss due to alcohol-related accidents exceeds $5 billion annually and over $5
million is expended yearly to prosecute drunk drivers. Bradbury, The Random Killers, 17
THE PROSECUTOR 5 (1982). The United States Supreme Court has recognized the "carnage
caused by drunk drivers" in referring to the strong public policy in enforcing drunk driving
laws. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983).
2. Only cancer and heart disease were responsible for more deaths among Montana's
adult population than drunk driving. Hearings on H.B. 540 Before the House Judiciary
Comm., 48th Leg. (Feb. 10, 1983) (statement of Colonel Bob Landon of the Highway Patrol
Division) [hereinafter cited as Hearings H.B. 540 Before House]. In 1981, 20 percent of all
traffic fatalities involved teenagers. Fifty-five percent of these teenage deaths involved the
use of alcohol. In 1982, these statistics had risen to 22 percent and 60 percent respectively.
Exhibit P, Hearings on H.B. 250 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 48th Leg. (Jan. 26,
1983) [hereinafter Hearings H.B. 250 Before House]. Drunk driving was the fourth leading
cause of accidents in Montana in 1982. Exhibit J, Hearings on H.B. 250 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 48th Leg. (Mar. 9, 1983) [hereinafter Hearings H.B. 250 Before Senate].
3. ALCOHOL WORLD, supra note 1, at 2.
4. Id.
5. Although there has been a societal recognition of the problem, there also has been a
reluctance to deal effectively with the drinking driver because of either apathetic or em-
pathetic feelings toward the drunk driver. "The public must be disabused of the notion that
laws prohibiting drunk driving contain more thunder than lightening." Bradbury, supra
note 1, at 5. "Public officials responsible for administering the drunk-driving laws of this
country for too long have approached the drinking driver problem with the pitiful cop-out,
1
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toward drinking and driving through long-term prevention and
education.
The 1983 Montana Legislature, responding to societal' and
monetary pressures,' adopted new and stricter laws to deal with
the drunk driver. Specifically, this new legislation extended- en-
forcement jurisdiction; provided faster and stiffer "implied con-
sent" administrative penalties; imposed mandatory jail sentences
for convicted drunk drivers; and recognized a "per se" driving of-
'there, but for the grace of God, go I.'" Yelverton, Alcoholism Is a Disease-Driving Drunk
Is a Crime, 17 THE PROSECUTOR 4 (1982).
6. According to a federal study of 25 states completed in early 1981, 15 of the surveyed
states passed drunk driving legislation that either mandated stricter sanctions for the con-
victed drunk driver or which plugged existing loopholes in their statutes to ensure more
consistent enforcement. Hall & Quinlan, Adjudication of Driving While Intoxicated Laws
Overview: Problems and Needs, 17 THE PROSEcUTOR 11, 13 (1982). The National Safety
Council reported that in the first three months of 1982, 30 states and the District of Colum-
bia introduced or enacted legislation intended to address the problem of drinking and driv-
ing. Legislative Approaches to Reducing DWI, ALCOHOL WORLD, supra note 1, at 19. See
also Exhibit E, Hearings on H.B. 540 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 48th Leg. (Mar.
23, 1983) [hereinafter Hearings H.B. 540 Before Senate], "You will be taking a giant step
forward for the people of Montana if you pass [this legislation]." "[Ilt will be a strong mes-
sage to the public and individual drivers that drunk driving will not be tolerated in Mon-
tana." Exhibit D, Hearings on S.B. 313 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 48th Leg. (Feb.
4, 1983) [hereinafter Hearings S.B. 313 Before Senate].
7. If the State of Montana passed drunk driving laws in conformity with federal stan-
dards, a substantial amount of federal monetary assistance would become available to en-
force these laws and to establish programs aimed at prevention and treatment. 23 U.S.C. §
408(a) (1982). See 23 U.S.C. § 408(e)(1) (1982), providing in relevant part that money would
be available if the following conditions were met:
(A) for the prompt suspension, for a period not less than ninety days in the
case of a first offender and not less than one year in the case of any repeat of-
fender, of the driver's license of any individual who a law enforcement officer has
probable cause under State law to believe has committed an alcohol-related traffic
offense, and (i) to whom is administered one or more chemical tests to determine
whether the individual was intoxicated while operating the motor vehicle and who
is determined, as a result of such tests, to be intoxicated, or (ii) who refuses to
submit to such a test as proposed by the officer;
(B) for a mandatory sentence, which shall not be subject to suspension or
probation, of (i) imprisonment for not less than forty-eight consecutive hours, or
(ii) not less than ten days of community service, of any person convicted of driv-
ing while intoxicated more than once in any five-year period;
(C) that any person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 percent or
greater when driving a motor vehicle shall be deemed to be driving while intoxi-
cated; and
(D) for increased efforts or resources dedicated to the enforcement of alcohol-
related traffic laws and increased efforts to inform the public of such enforcement.
Approximately $300,000 per year for three years was available for training and equip-
ment. Also, it was possible to receive an additional grant in the fourth year with federal
approval. Hearings on S.B. 313 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 48th Leg. (Mar. 11,
1983) [hereinafter cited as Hearings S.B. 313 Before House].
"The main thing involved in the federal money is related to training, publicity, and
prevention." Id. See also 23 U.S.C. § 408(b) (1982).
2
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fense. This comment focuses on the current Montana law on drink-
ing and driving. The purposes of this comment are to inform the
reader of the history of drunk driving legislation in Montana; to
point out the major changes in Montana's drunk driving statutes
that were mandated by the 1983 Legislature; and finally, to give
some insight into the legislative thought behind these changes.
II. PRE-1983 LEGISLATION
An early day editorial comment warned of the potential
problems that would be associated with the development of the au-
tomobile and the automobile's imbibing operator:
The management of automobile wagons is far more dangerous for
men who drink than the driving of locomotives on steel rails. Ine-
briates and moderate drinkers are the most incapable of all per-
sons to drive motor wagons. The general palsy and diminished
power of control of both the reason and senses are certain to in-
vite disaster in every attempt to guide such wagons.8
Montana's lawmakers recognized as early as 1895 the inherent
danger of a person consuming alcohol and taking control of a mo-
bile vehicle. "Every person who is intoxicated while in charge of a
locomotive engine . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor."9 In 1903, the
Montana Legislature passed a statute making it a crime to employ
a person to convey passengers on any public highway or road if
that person was "addicted to drunkeness."10
The first comprehensive laws directed at the drinking driver
were enacted by the Montana Legislature in 1929.11 These statutes
made it a misdemeanor crime for a person to drink intoxicants and
drive a motor vehicle on the public thoroughfares of the state.12
The next major change in drunk driving laws did not take place
until 1955. In that year, the Legislative Assembly set out a uniform
compilation of statutes 3 regulating the operation of all motor vehi-
8. Bradbury, supra note 1, at 5 (citing a 1904 editorial).
9. MONT. CODES ANN. § 690 (1895).
10. 1903 Mont. Laws ch. 44, § 82. The historical context of this provision and the
accompanying enactments suggest that this law was directed at the stagecoach and horse
carriage driver. However, this law certainly would have been broad enough to cover the
resourceful entrepreneur who conceived the idea of a motorized cab service.
11. 1929 Mont. Laws ch. 166.
12. Id. at § 1. This Act also defined the operation of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of a narcotic drug as a crime. Id. That subject is beyond the scope of this article,
but for informative source material on the subject, see Hackett, Prosecution of "Driving
Under the Influence of Drug Cases," 17 THE PROSECUTOR 19 (1982).
13. 1955 Mont. Laws ch. 263. The laws relating to the intoxicated driver were found at
Art. IV, § 39 of the Act.
1985]
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cles on the highways of the state. The 1957 Legislature substan-
tially amended the 1955 enactments.14 These amendments would
serve as the foundation for drunk driving laws in Montana until
1983.
The 1957 drunk driving provisions, for the first time, acknowl-
edged that the amount of alcohol present in a vehicle operator's
blood would give rise to certain presumptions similar to the cur-
rent 1983 codifications. 15 The one exception was that legal intoxi-
cation was presumed at a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of
0.15% 11 rather than the present 0.10% level. In 1971, the statutes
were amended to reduce the legal intoxication presumption to
0.10% .17
An "implied consent"18 proviso was added to Montana's drunk
driving statutory scheme in 1971.11 Under the implied consent sec-
tion, a suspected drunk driver who refused a chemical analysis of
his blood, breath, or urine was subject to suspension of his driving
privileges. This provision, although substantially modified, was
carried over in the 1983 laws.2"
Sentencing of the convicted drunk driver was addressed by the
1977 Legislature. A mandatory ten day jail term was prescribed for
a driver convicted of a third or subsequent offense of DUI.21 This
same legislative session, however, softened this position. Judges
were granted discretionary authority to suspend any sentence im-
posed by the DUI statutes if the offender successfully completed a
court-approved driver improvement or alcohol treatment pro-
22gram. This legislation recognized what has been termed as the
"health-legal" approach23 to drunk driving. Also, in 1979, a "con-
14. See 1957 Mont. Laws ch. 194.
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(3) (1983) provides that if a vehicle operator has a
BAC of 0.05% or less it will be presumed that the person is not under the influence of
alcohol; if the person's BAC is between 0.05% and 0.10% there is no presumption of intoxi-
cation but the BAC may be considered as competent evidence of guilt or innocence; a BAC
of 0.10% or above gives rise to a presumption that the vehicle operator was under the influ-
ence of alcohol.
16. 1957 Mont. Laws ch. 194, § 1(b)(3).
17. 1971 Mont. Laws ch. 132, § 1(b)(3).
18. For a critical analysis of implied consent legislation, see generally Note, Implied
Consent Legislation in Drunk Driving Cases: The Case for Repeal-People v. Moselle, Peo-
ple v. Daniel, People v. Wolter, 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982), 6
WESTERN NEW ENG. L. REV. 465 (1983).
19. 1971 Mont. Laws ch. 131.
20. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402(3) (1983).
21. 1977 Mont. Laws ch. 289.
22. Id. at ch. 430.
23. Studies have shown that an alcoholic is 21 times more likely to cause a fatal acci-
dent than a moderate drinker. ALCOHOL AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at 240. The Montana
legislators in 1983 were presented with documentary materials showing a link between
[Vol. 46
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viction" was defined so as to limit its application for sentence en-
hancement purposes to five years.2 4 The 1981 Legislature made the
completion of an alcohol information course mandatory for any
convicted drunk driver regardless of any other punishment pro-
vided by statute.2 5
III. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE-THE OFFENSE AFTER 1983
A violation of Montana's current DUI statute occurs if a per-
son is: (1) under the influence of alcohol;2 6 (2) driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle; 27 and (3) operating the motor
vehicle on "ways of the state open to the public. '28
A. Intoxication
"Under the influence" is a question of fact2 1 describing the
level of driving impairment that alcohol consumption must cause
in order to secure a DUI conviction. The particular wording of a
DUI statute is generally held to be determinative in deciding if a
driver has reached a proscribed level of impairment. In Montana, a
driver is criminally culpable if his intoxication affects in the
"slightest degree" his ability to operate a motor vehicle.30 Factors
that have been held to support a finding of intoxication include:
drunk driving and alcoholism. Exhibit D, Hearings S.B. 313 Before Senate, supra note 6
(Feb. 4, 1983). See also comments of the National Council on Alcoholism, Inc. in Perspec-
tives: An Interview Feature, ALCOHOL WORLD, supra note 1, at 10.
24. 1979 Mont. Laws ch. 56. "Conviction" for purposes of drunk driving was to have
the generic definition found at MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-201 (1983) and additionally would
apply to the forfeiture of bail or security deposited to secure the defendant's presence. Id.
25. 1981 Mont. Laws ch. 451.
26. The influence of drugs on a person's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle is
covered by subsections (b) and (c) of MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(1) (1983). The 1983 Mon-
tana Legislature added a new provision, subsection (d), to deal with the vehicle operator
who is under the influence of a combination of drugs and alcohol. 1983 Mont. Laws ch. 698 §
5. These topics are beyond the scope of this article.
27. A "motor vehicle" includes every vehicle propelled by its own power and designed
primarily to transport persons or property on the highways of this state. MONT. CODE ANN. §
61-1-102 (1983). A bicycle is excluded from the definition of motor vehicle. Id. The traffic
regulation statute, however, recognizes that a bicycle operator is granted the same rights
and duties as any other operator of a motor vehicle, MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-602 (1983);
therefore, one could argue that the DUI provisions are applicable to the bicycle rider.
28. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(1)(a) (1983). This phrase has a defined meaning that
will be discussed in detail in the text of this article. See infra text accompanying notes 48-
53.
29. State v. Medicine Bull, 152 Mont. 34, 39, 445 P.2d 916, 919 (1968).
30. In State v. Cline, 135 Mont. 372, 339 P.2d 657 (1959), the Montana Supreme Court
specifically approved an instruction that defined "under the influence" to be proved "[i]f
the ability of the driver of an automobile has been lessened in the slightest degree by use of
intoxicating liquors ...." Id. at 379, 339 P.2d at 662 (emphasis added).
5
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testimony as to the actual amount of alcohol consumed, the smell
of liquor, glassy eyes, and unstable or clumsy locomotion;3" testi-
mony of observers, particularly trained observers such as law en-
forcement officers, doctors, and nurses; 32 confusion, disorientation,
and unresponsive and incoherent answers to questions;" and
slurred speech and admissions by the defendant about how much
alcohol he has ingested. 4
The majority of the above intoxication indicators are passive,
i.e., they require no active participation by the driver. Formal ob-
servations or on the scene testing procedures are also probative in-
dicators of an intoxicated condition. Field sobriety testing is a
psycho/physical evaluation of a driver's capacity to perform dic-
tated maneuvers involving physical coordination. 5 These tests also
assess the driver's ability to clearly understand and follow direc-
tions." The Montana Supreme Court has held that field sobriety
testing is not a search and therefore does not enjoy any federal or
state constitutional protection.3 7 Additionally, an arresting law en-
forcement officer is under no duty to inform a suspected drunk
31. State v. Cook, - Mont. -, 645 P.2d 1367, 1370 (1982); Medicine Bull, 152
Mont. at 38, 445 P.2d at 919.
32. State v. Taylor, - Mont. -, 661 P.2d 33 (1983); State v. Rumley, - Mont.
- 634 P.2d 446 (1981); State v. Souhrada, 122 Mont. 377, 204 P.2d 792 (1949).
33. Rumley, - Mont. at - , 634 P.2d at 447.
34. Cook, __ Mont. at - , 645 P.2d at 1370. See also COLORADO ASSOCIATION OF
CHIEFS OF POLICE, D.U.I. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL FOR THE STATE OF COLORADO 3-5 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as D.U.I. MANUAL], for a listing of observable behaviors a law enforcement
officer is trained to recognize as indicators of intoxication.
35. The "Romberg test" is a measure of intoxication based on a particular swaying
pattern after a person has been instructed to assume a rigid upright position with his head
tilted back and eyes closed. The law enforcement officer concentrates on a focal point on the
person's body for approximately 15 seconds. Any kind of bodily circular movement is con-
sidered a negative result. A front to rear or side to side swaying motion is a positive indica-
tor of intoxication. Walking a straight line, finger to ear or nose, and one leg balance are also
tests of physical coordination. See D.U.I. MANUAL, supra note 34, at 19-20; L. TAYLOR,
DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE § 4.1.11, at 195-201 (1981). The newest field testing procedure that
is being used on a limited basis in Montana is gaze nystagmus. This test measures the move-
ment of the eyes. A person under the influence of alcohol will develop a jerking movement
of the eye sooner than a sober person. This test is now part of the Montana Law Enforce-
ment Academy's curriculum. It is being used by some members of the Missoula County
Sheriffis Office and a few state highway patrolman based in the Missoula region. Lawmen
crack down to get drunks off road, Missoulian, Dec. 13, 1984, at 9. Gaze nystagmus also is
used currently on an experimental basis in California, Colorado, and Florida. TAYLOR, supra
note 35, § 4.1.14a, at 88-94 (Supp. 1984).
36. A law enforcement officer may evaluate a person's ability to understand directions
at the time he is explaining the physical coordination movements. Also, a suspected drunk
driver may be asked to recite the alphabet (the law enforcement officer first should be sure
the person has the educational background to know the alphabet) or to reverse count. TAY-
LOR, supra note 35, § 4.1.14, at 200.
37. State v. Purdie, - Mont. - , 680 P.2d 576, 578 (1984).
6
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driver that the driver need not participate in the testing.3 8
The final indicator of intoxication is the chemical test result of
of the suspect's blood, breath, or urine. Prior to 1983, alcohol con-
centration was measured solely in terms of grams of alcohol per
100 cubic centimeters of blood. 9 The 1983 Montana Legislature
expanded the definition of alcohol concentration to include the
amount of alcohol in a particular sample of breath or urine.40 An
alcohol concentration of 0.10% or greater raises the presumption
that the person is under the influence of alcohol.4 ' Apparently in
response to decisions by the United States and the Montana Su-
preme Courts, the 1983 Legislature specifically modified this pre-
sumption, making it rebuttable.42
B. Physical Control of a Motor Vehicle
The phrase "driving under the influence" is somewhat of a
misnomer because there is no requirement that a person must ac-
tually be driving a motor vehicle to commit the offense of DUL."
The person need only be in "actual physical control" of a motor
vehicle. 44 Actual physical control has been defined by the Montana
Supreme Court as "existing or present bodily restraint, directing
influence, domination, or regulation of an automobile."' 5 The Mon-
tana court has sustained a finding of actual physical control when
the driver of a vehicle was asleep or passed out in an automobile
that was stuck in a borrow pit and was incapable of moving."' The
court emphasized that in this situation the driver had not relin-
38. Id. at __, 680 P.2d at 579.
39. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(3), (4) (1981) (amended 1983).
40. 1983 Mont. Laws ch. 698, § 7 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-407 (1983)).
Alcohol concentration now can be determined according to the number of grams of alcohol
per 210 liters of breath, or 75.3 milliliters of urine. Id.
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(3)(c) (1983).
42. 1983 Mont. Laws ch. 698, § 5 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(3)(c)
(1983)). In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the United States Supreme Court
held that a conclusive presumption in a criminal action had the effect of unconstitutionally
shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant. Id. at 523-24. The Montana Supreme
Court applied similar reasoning in City of Missoula v. Shea, - Mont. -, 661 P.2d 410
(1983), to hold that a prima facie criminal presumption is unconstitutional. Id. at __, 661
P.2d at 414.
43. See State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243, 248, 321 P.2d 615, 618 (1958) (movement of a
vehicle is unnecessary to charge DUI).
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401(1)(a) (1983).
45. Ruona, 133 Mont. at 248, 321 P.2d at 618.
46. Taylor, - Mont. at __, 661 P.2d at 34. Contra Arizona v. Zavala, 136 Ariz.
356, 358-59, 666 P.2d 456, 458-59 (1983). See also IDAHO CODE § 49-1102(6) (Supp. 1983)
(repealed 1984) which provides that a person is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
if that person is "in the driver's position with the motor running or with the motor vehicle
moving."
1985]
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quished regulation or control over the vehicle."' The Montana Su-
preme Court has thus demonstrated that it will construe the actual
physical control element of a DUI charge liberally.
C. Geographic Application
The present DUI statutes are enforceable in all publicly trav-
elled areas. Where Montana's DUI statutes should apply was the
subject of considerable debate during the 1983 legislative session.
The 1955 enactment of uniform traffic laws made the DUI laws
enforceable on "highways and elsewhere throughout the state."'"
In 1979, during recodification from the Revised Codes of Montana
to the Montana Code Annotated, enforcement jurisdiction was lim-
ited to the highways of this state. This change caused considerable
problems in the enforcement 49 of the DUI laws and the prosecu-
tion50 of the drinking driver.
The 1983 Montana Legislature responded to this problem by
extending the applicability of the DUI statutes to the "ways of the
state open to the public. ' 51 This phrase encompasses all highways,
roads, alleys, lanes, parking areas, or other public places adopted
and fitted to public travel and that are in common use by the pub-
lic. 2 It was estimated that this single change in the DUI statutes
would account for a ten percent increase in DUI arrests.5 3 All stat-
utory DUI provisions were conformed to adopt this new geographic
enforcement definition.
47. Taylor, - Mont. at -, 661 P.2d at 34.
48. 1955 Mont. Laws ch. 263, § 22. In 1971, the Montana Highway Patrol and state
sheriffs were given the authority to enforce DUI laws on forest development roads. 1971
Mont. Laws ch. 139, § 2.
49. See, e.g., Hearings on S.B. 260 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 48th Leg.
(Jan. 27, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Hearings S.B. 260] (Colonel Landon of the Montana
Highway Patrol testified that his department receives numerous complaints of drunk drivers
in areas where his officers have no jurisdiction); Hearings S.B. 260 (Mar. 11, 1983) (Betty
Wing, Missoula Deputy County Attorney, expressed concern about drunk drivers in public
parks, on the University of Montana campus, or on lands not open to the public). Under the
pre-1983 language a drunk driver in a K-Mart lot could not be arrested. Id. (statement of
Senator Halligan).
50. See Exhibit D, Hearings on S.B. 260 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 48th
Leg. (Mar. 11, 1983) (Jim Nugent, Missoula City Attorney, complained about the prosecu-
tion problems he had encountered since the 1979 change). The Montana Supreme Court
had to struggle with the definition of "highway" to reach its result in Taylor, __ Mont. at
__ 661 P.2d at 35. How a state statute defines "highway" is an important consideration in
the formulation of a defensive strategy to a DUI charge. TAYLOR, supra note 35, § 1.1.3 at
16-17.
51. 1983 Mont. Laws ch. 659 and 698 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-101(1)
(1983)).
52. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-101(1) (1983).
53. Fiscal Note, Hearings S.B. 260, supra note 49 (Jan. 28, 1983).
[Vol. 46
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D. Implied Consent
Under implied consent provisions, the law assumes that an op-
erator of a motor vehicle, who is suspected of being under the in-
fluence of alcohol, has consented to a chemical test to determine if
alcohol is present within his body. The driver may refuse to par-
ticipate in the testing procedure. This refusal, however, may sub-
ject the driver to the administrative sanction of suspension or rev-
ocation of his driving privileges. 4
Montana's implied consent statute"5 was expanded and re-
structured by the 1983 Legislature.5 This major statutory overhaul
was a legislative attempt to encourage suspected drunk drivers to
submit to a chemical test of their blood, breath, or urine. 57 Because
these tests can produce incriminating evidence for the prosecu-
tion's case, this legislation received support from the Department
of Justice and prosecutors.5
A prerequisite to the testing procedure is a valid arrest.5 9 An
exception to the valid arrest requirement exists when the driver is
"unconscious or . . .otherwise in a condition rendering him inca-
pable of refusal." 60 The meaning of this latter phrase has been the
subject of considerable controversy. The Montana Supreme Court
applies the standard set forth in State v. Mangels1 to determine if
a driver's condition renders him incapable of consent. This stan-
dard of incapacity is judged by the best evidence that is reasonably
available to the law enforcement officer.6 2 In Mangels, evidence of
the defendant's confused mental state coupled with minor injuries
54. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-5-206 (1983) empowers the Division of Motor Vehicles to
suspend or revoke driver's licenses.
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402 (1983).
56. 1983 Mont. Laws ch. 602.
57. Sarah Power of the Montana Attorney General's Office testified that the implied
consent legislation was the key to the entire drunk driving legislation. She noted that two
other bills set up stringent driving standards and tough penalties, but that "[w]ithout a
similar increase in the implied consent area, more and more individuals will refuse the test
in an attempt to avoid the stiffer criminal and administrative penalties which accompany
DUI charges. That occurrence would nullify the entire war currently being waged on drink-
ing and driving." Exhibit C, Hearings S.B. 313 Before Senate, supra note 6 (Feb. 4, 1983).
58. "The Department [of Justice] believes that by increasing the penalty substantially
an individual will be less likely to refuse to submit to a chemical test." Hearings S.B. 313,
supra note 57. Jim Nugent expressed the view that increasing implied consent penalties
would facilitate the prosecution of offenders because fewer persons would be as likely to
refuse to submit to the tests. Exhibit B, Hearings S.B. 313 Before House, supra note 7
(March 11, 1983).
59. State v. Campbell, - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 190, 194 (1980).
60. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402(2) (1983).
61. 166 Mont. 190, 531 P.2d 1313 (1975).
62. Id. at 194, 531 P.2d at 1315.
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from an automobile accident were not sufficient indicia to convince
the Montana court that Mangels was incapable of giving consent.6 3
In more recent cases, the Montana Supreme Court has accepted
evidence of incoherence and confusion combined with serious
physical injury to sustain a finding of inability to render consent.6'
A liberal interpretation of this standard was enunciated in State v.
Morgan.s5 Although the defendant was conscious and apparently
coherent and able to respond to questions, Morgan's doctor deter-
mined that his physical condition was serious enough to refuse the
law enforcement officer's request to talk with Morgan. The Mon-
tana court upheld the use of Morgan's BAC results based on the
doctor's determination that Morgan was in a condition rendering
him incapable of refusing consent.6 6
The fact that a person refused to submit to a chemical test
may now be used as evidence in the prosecution's case. 7 This is
the result of a protracted legal battle that eventually made its way
to the United States Supreme Court." The Montana Supreme
Court now holds that the use of this evidence is not proscribed by
Montana's constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination. 9
When a suspected drunk driver refuses to submit to a chemi-
cal test, a law enforcement officer may now seize his driver's li-
cense on behalf of the Montana Motor Vehicle Division.70 A tem-
porary seventy-two hour driving permit will be issued to the driver
63. Id. at 193, 531 P.2d at 1315.
64. See, e.g., Rumley, - Mont. __, 634 P.2d 446; Campbell, - Mont. -, 615
P.2d 190.
65. - Mont. - , 646 P.2d 1177 (1982).
66. Id. at -, 646 P.2d at 1180.
67. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-404(2) (1983).
68. The Montana Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, held that the use of evidence of a
defendant's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test was a violation of a defendant's consti-
tutional right against self-incrimination. State v. Jackson, 195 Mont. 185, 192, 637 P.2d 1, 5
(1981). A petition for writ of certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court.
Montana v. Jackson, 460 U.S. 1030 (1983). The Montana judgment was vacated and the case
was remanded to determine if the Montana judgment was based on federal or state constitu-
tional grounds. Id. If the judgment was not based on state constitutional protections, the
Montana court was to consider the Jackson case in light of South Dakota v. Neville, 459
U.S. 553 (1983). In Neville, the Court held that the use of evidence of a refusal to submit to
a breath test was not a constitutional violation. Id. at 924.
69. On remand the Montana court held that the earlier Jackson decision was based on
federal rather than independent state grounds. State v. Jackson, - Mont. ., 672 P.2d
255, 258 (1983). Consequently, Montana's "constitutional prohibition against self-incrimina-
tion (was] not offended by the admission in evidence of defendant's refusal to submit to a
breathalyzer sobriety test." Id. at -, 672 P.2d at 260. Justice Shea strongly protested,
stating that he believed Article II, § 25 of the Montana Constitution had been violated,
"and that is what I thought we held in Jackson L" Id. at -, 672 P.2d at 262 (Shea, J.,
dissenting).
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402(3) (1983).
10
ontana Law Review, Vol. 46 [1985], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol46/iss2/6
1985] 1983 DUI STATUTES 319
by the arresting officer. 7' The officer then must submit a sworn re-
port to the motor vehicle division detailing the circumstances of
the refusal. 2 On a first refusal, the division will suspend the
driver's license for ninety days. If the refusal was within five years
of a previous refusal, the driver's license will be revoked for a pe-
riod of one year. In either case there is no opportunity during the
suspension or revocation period for the driver to obtain a restricted
probationary or occupational driver's license.7 -
A person who has had his driver's license suspended or re-
voked under this provision has the right to appeal the revocation
or suspension to state district court.7 ' The United States Supreme
Court has upheld pre-hearing driver's license suspension statutes
like Montana's against constitutional due process attacks.7 5 In
Mackey v. Montrym7 6 the Court set out a three part balancing
test 77 to evaluate the validity of such a statute. The Court went on
to hold that the summary suspension of the driver's license of a
person who refused to submit to a breath analysis test was justified
by the compelling interest a state has in highway safety.78
Two changes were made in the suspension or revocation ap-
peal process by the 1983 Legislature. Alternative forums are now
available to petition for a hearing on the suspension or revocation,
i.e., the district court in the county either of the person's residence
or in which the arrest was made.79 Also, a more expedient review of
71. Id. at § 61-8-402(4). The 72 hour period begins at the moment of arrest and issu-
ance of the temporary permit.
72. Id. at § 61-8-402(3).
73. Id. at § 61-8-402(5). The suspension or revocation period begins on the date the
officer's sworn report is received by the motor vehicle division.
74. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-403 (1983).
75. In Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977), an Illinois statute authorized the Secretary
of State to suspend or revoke a driver's license without a preliminary hearing if there was a
sufficient showing that the driver fell into any of 18 enumerated categories. The Court up-
held the validity of this statute: "[T]he public interests present. . . are sufficiently visible
and weighty for the State to make its summary initial decision effective without a predeci-
sion administrative hearing." Id. at 115. Cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-5-205, -206 (1983).
76. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
77. The Court, citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), described the
balancing test: (1) the private, individual interest is affected by the official action; (2) the
likelihood of the erroneous deprivation of a private interest as a consequence of the sum-
mary procedure; (3) the governmental function involved, the state interest served, and the
administrative and fiscal burden resulting from the summary procedure. Mackey, 443 U.S.
at 17.
78. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 19.
79. 1983 Mont. Laws ch. 602, § 2 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-403 (1983)).
This change apparently was meant to benefit a person, e.g., a college student, who was ar-
rested for DUI in a place other than his own county of residence. See Hearings S.B. 313
Before Senate, supra note 6 (Mar. 22, 1983).
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the suspension or revocation now is mandated.80 The issuance of
the seventy-two hour temporary driving permit should allow a per-
son sufficient time to get into court and to ask for a stay order
pending his challenge. The issues to be considered by the district
court-probable cause, valid arrest, and refusal-remain the
same.
8 1
E. Per Se
A per se drunk driving statute was passed by the 1983 Mon-
tana Legislature. 2 In a traditional DUI charge, intoxication gener-
ally is based on a behavioral test. A per se charge is chemically
based. Under this statute, the results of a chemical analysis of a
person's blood, breath, or urine are not simply treated as evidence
from which a rebuttable presumption of intoxication may be
drawn. Rather, the offense is merely having a BAC of 0.10% and
being in control of a motor vehicle. The evidence becomes the
crime itself.83 Prosecutions are thereby expedited and defenses are
few.
A primary concern of the legislators was that the per se stat-
ute created an unconstitutional presumption of intoxication. 4
Steve Johnson of the Montana Attorney General's Office, testifying
in support of the per se bill, correctly pointed out that in a per se
offense, there is no presumption. Mr. Johnson noted the presump-
tion of intoxication only applies to a traditional DUI charge. Fur-
ther, under the traditional charge, the chemical test corroborates
the observed physical behavior of the defendant by the arresting
officer. Alternatively, there are only two necessary elements of
proof necessary to sustain a per se charge: (1) a person was driving
or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on the ways of this
state open to the public and (2) that person had a BAC of 0.10%
or greater.8 5 Per se is not a subpart of the traditional DUI charge.88
Per se is and was intended to be a separate and distinct offense.
Per se statutes have been unsuccessfully challenged in other
80. 1983 Mont. Laws ch. 698. Formerly, a hearing had to be held within 30 days after
the county attorney received written notification of the request. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-
403 (1981). The 30 day period has now been shortened to 10 days. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-
403 (1983).
81. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-403 (1983).
82. 1983 Mont. Laws ch. 698, § 4 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-406 (1983)).
83. TAYLOR, supra note 35, § 5.2.1 at 120 (Supp. 1984).
84. Hearings H.B. 540 Before House, supra note 2 (Feb. 10, 1983) (Chairman Brown
questioned the impact of the courts' decisions in Sandstrom and Shea on per se statutes).
85. Id. (statements of Steve Johnson).
86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-406 (1983).
[Vol. 46
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jurisdictions. A Washington state defendant claimed per se stat-
utes create an irrebuttable presumption violative of the due pro-
cess and equal protection provisions of the Constitution.s7 The
Washington Appeals Court determined that the state statutory
scheme abolished the presumption and simply enumerates alterna-
tive methods of committing the offense of DUI.8 s
In Burg v. Municipal Court,8 9 the California Supreme Court
exhaustively reviewed the constitutional controversy surrounding
per se statutes. The court struck down the void for vagueness chal-
lenge because the per se statute provided a precise standard of en-
forcement; therefore, arbitrary or discretionary enforcement was
eliminated.90 Whether or not a person has fair notice of the pro-
scribed conduct was addressed by the California court in terms of
what an ordinary person should perceive from drinking alcohol,
i.e., if a person has consumed a substantial amount of alcohol, he
should know he is in jeopardy of violating the statute."1
Under present Montana statutes, a suspected drunk driver
who submits to a chemical test can be charged under both the
traditional DUI charge and the per se offense. He may be con-
victed, however, on only one charge.92 A conviction of either of-
fense will have the same result for purposes of the administrative
sanction of driver's license suspension or revocation. 3 Any combi-
nation of per se and DUI convictions within a five year period will
have a cumulative effect resulting in a one year driver's license
revocation. 4
87. City of Seattle v. Urban, 32 Wash. App. 634, 637, 648 P.2d 922, 924 (1982).
88. Id. at 637, 648 P.2d at 925.
89. 35 Cal. 3d 257, 673 P.2d 732, 198 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1983).
90. Id. at 269-70, 673 P.2d at 740, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
91. Id. at 270-72, 673 P.2d at 740-42, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 152-54. The court noted that it
requires more than a small amount of alcohol to produce a BAC of 0.10%. A 160 pound
person would have to drink three to four average drinks in a one hour period to reach this
level. Id.
92. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-408 (1983). If both charges are presented to a jury, it is
important that the jury verdict form clearly indicate the separateness of the offenses. The
jury should be instructed on the necessity to denominate which offense, if any, it believes
the defendant has committed.
93. A first conviction of DUI or per se results in a six month driver's license suspen-
sion. A second conviction on either charge within five years of the previous violation will
result in a one year revocation. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-5-208(2) (1983). Per se and DUI
convictions also accumulate the same number of "points" toward an adjudication that a
driver is an habitual traffic offender. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-11-203(2)(d) (1983).
94. The Motor Vehicle Division has adopted this position based on its interpretation
of MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-5-208(2) (1983). This statutory construction is being challenged
presently in at least two district courts. Telephone interview with James Scheier, Montana
Attorney General's Office (Dec. 17, 1984).
19851
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F. Admissibility of Evidence
The 1983 Montana legislators attempted to ease the admissi-
bility requirements of certain forms of documentary evidence con-
nected with DUI and per se prosecutions. The purpose of this pro-
posal was to reduce the burden placed on state crime laboratory
technicians who were required to travel all over the state to testify
in DUI trials.s
The new legislation provides that a Department of Justice lab-
oratory analysis report of blood, breath, or urine or the report of a
law enforcement officer who conducted a breath test and verified
the results of that test, can be introduced in the prosecution's case-
in-chief without the testimony of the person who prepared the re-
port or performed the test.' 6 The present statute97 indicates that a
chemical analysis report complying with statutory requirements"s
is admissible evidence to prove a defendant's BAC.
This admissibility provision has particular significance in a per
se prosecution because the state generally only has to produce the
arresting officer. 9 The responsibility0 " to subpoena the laboratory
technician is then on the defendant. The defendant may or may
not choose to call the technician depending on the credibility of
the testing procedure and its results. In a traditional DUI prosecu-
tion, when the BAC is close to 0.10%, it would be advisable for the
prosecution to call the laboratory technician as an expert witness
95. Hearings H.B. 540 Before Senate, supra note 6 (Mar. 22, 1983) (statement of Jim
Nugent). Arnold Melnikoff, state crime laboratory technician, complained to the Montana
Supreme Court in October of 1977 about the costly administrative burden that was placed
on the resources of the laboratory due to the evidentiary requirements of having the chem-
ist's actual presence at a DWI trial. Letter from Arnold B. Melnikoff to Ray Stewart, court
administrator of the Montana Supreme Court (Oct. 7, 1977).
96. H.B. 540, 48th Leg. § 5 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-404(1)(b) (1983)).
Also, any report prepared by a laboratory either certified by or exempt from certification
would be admissible. Id. See MONT. ADMIN. R. §§ 23.3.901-941.
97. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-404(1)(b) (1983).
98. If a breath test was performed by a law enforcement officer, the report must indi-
cate that the officer performed the test according to the applicable rules of the Department
of Justice. See MONT. ADMIN. R. §§ 23.3.901-941. The officer must verify the correctness of
the results. If the test was of blood or urine, the report must indicate that the test was
performed at the state crime laboratory or some other laboratory certified or exempted from
certification. A verification of the results is desirable, but there is no statutory requirement.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-404(1)(b)(i), (ii) (1983). See also State v. McDonald, - Mont.
-, 697 P.2d 1328 (1985), which sets out the foundation requirements to admit evidence of
a DUI defendant's blood alcohol content and a test report.
99. The law enforcement officer's primary task is to establish the validity of the arrest.
If a blood test was performed, the prosecutor must produce the person who withdrew the
blood and establish his competence to do so in accordance with MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-
405(1) (1983).
100. Presumably, this responsibility includes the expense of producing the witness.
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to testify to the effects alcohol has on bodily functions and how a
particular BAC will impair driving ability.
This provision is a distinct advantage in the prosecution of
DUI and per se offenses. 10 1 A question remains, though, as to the
power of the Legislature to enact this provision. The report, to be
admissible, must fall under an exception to the hearsay rule. Rule
803(8) of the Montana Rules of Evidence is the most likely appli-
cable exception. 102 In State v. Snider,0 3 the Montana Supreme
Court held that a written criminal laboratory report prepared by a
state crime laboratory chemist, although hearsay, was admissible
in evidence without the testimony of the chemist.0 4 Snider,
though, was decided prior to the adoption of the Montana Rules of
Evidence.0 5 As adopted, these rules specifically exclude the kind
of reports' referred to in the DUI statute. Additionally, the com-
mission comments state that Snider was overruled by the adoption
of the rules. 107
The Montana Constitution grants the Montana Supreme
Court the power to adopt rules of practice and procedure.108 The
Legislature has a limited veto power.' 01 Recent case law interpret-
ing these constitutional grants of authority provides that "the leg-
islature is empowered to veto any such rules promulgated by [the
Montana Supreme Court]. However, once a legislative veto is exer-
cised, the legislature is not empowered to fill the vacuum by enact-
ing its own legislation . . . ."0 An argument may be made, none-
theless, that because the supreme court was aware of the
101. Particularly in larger cities where there are numerous DUI and per se prosecu-
tions, the burden on state laboratory personnel is greatest.
102. The authentication requirement could be dealt with under MONT. R. EVID.
901(b)(7), 902(2), (4), or (8).
103. 168 Mont. 220, 541 P.2d 1204 (1975).
104. Id. at 228, 541 P.2d at 1210.
105. The current rules were adopted by the Montana Supreme Court by Sup. Ct. Or-
der 12729 (Dec. 29, 1976) (effective July 1, 1977).
106. MONT. R. Evmn. 803(8) excludes investigative reports by police and other law en-
forcement personnel; investigative reports prepared by or for a government, a public office,
or an agency when offered by it in a case in which it is a party; or a factual finding offered
by the government in criminal cases. Id. at 803(8)(i)-(iii).
107. MONT. R. EVID. 803(8) commission comments.
108. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(3).
109. The Montana Constitution provides that the Legislature may disapprove of any
rule promulgated by the supreme court in the two legislative sessions following adoption of
the particular rule. Id.
110. Coate v. Omholt, - Mont. - , 662 P.2d 591, 600 (1983). The court noted,
"[c]learly... Art. VII, § 2(3) vests the rule-making authority in the supreme court subject
only to legislative veto. This provision changed the rules of the supreme court and the legis-
lature." Id. at -, 662 P.2d at 599.
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problem"' and failed to act," 2 the Legislature could respond and
fill the void left by the court's inaction.
G. Sentencing
A dominant theme in all of the DUI proposals to the 1983
Montana Legislature was that mandatory sentencing would deter
the drinking driver. 3 The purpose of this legislation was to put
the driver on notice that he would spend time in jail if he were
convicted of DUI. Representative Vincent, the principal sponsor of
the mandatory sentencing bill stated: "One day in jail is a sobering
experience."" " Representative Vincent noted that when he had in-
troduced a similar proposal to the 1981 Legislature, he had trouble
getting cosponsors. There was an apparent change in the attitude
of his colleagues, because his 1983 proposal had thirty-five
cosponsors." 5
111. Arnold Melnikoff, in his October 7th letter, supra note 95, noted that before the
adoption of the new rules of evidence, state chemists averaged less than two trials per
month. Since the adoption of the rules on July 1, 1977, the chemists had attended 18 trials
and seven trials were scheduled for the next week.
112. Ray Stewart, supreme court administrator, communicated Mr. Melnikoff's con-
cerns to Sam Haddon, chairman of the Commission on Rules of Evidence, on November 17,
1977. Mr. Stewart's letter acknowledged that the Honorable Frank Haswell had suggested
that the Commission determine if the court should take some corrective action. Letter from
Ray Stewart to Sam Haddon (Nov. 17, 1977). Mr. Haddon promptly responded by sending
both Mr. Melnikoff's letter and Mr. Stewart's letter to members of the Commission and
asking for any recommendations for a court modification of Rule 803(8). Letter from San
Haddon to all members of the Montana Supreme Court Commission on Rules of Evidence
(Nov. 23, 1977). A draft of a proposed revised rule 803(8) was presented to the members of
the Commission. The revised rule would have allowed introduction of the reports if:
(1) the party offering the report, findings or matter serves a copy thereof, with a
Notice of Intent to Introduce upon each adverse party not less than ten (10) days
prior to trial, and (2) no adverse party files objection to the introduction of such
report, findings or matter within five (5) days thereafter.
Id. (Feb. 23, 1978). A ballot for or against the new amendment to the rule was enclosed with
the information on the rule change. Id.
According to Mr. Haddon, the proposed amendment was rejected. Mr. Haddon also
indicated that there never has been a renewed effort directed at the Rules Commission to
make any change in Rule 803(8) since the original change proposed in 1977. Telephone in-
terview with Mr. Sam Haddon (Dec. 18, 1984).
113. "If this bill is strong and enforced properly, it will create an effective deterrent.
Knowing you will spend one day in jail if apprehended and convicted will be a definite
deterrent." Hearings H.B. 250 Before House, supra note 2 (Jan. 26, 1983) (statement of
Representative Vincent). "[A] mandatory sentence that treats all offenders the same will
have a deterrent effect." Id. (statement of Doris Fisher, Montanans Against Drunk Drivers
[MADD]). "It would be a real deterrent for the offender to go to jail and wear the blue
outfits. That would definitely be a deterrent." Id. (statement of Betty Wing). "[Tihe public
wants a deterrent . I..." Id  (Feb. 16, 1983) (statement of Representative Keyser).
114. Hearings H.B. 250 Before House, supra note 2 (Jan. 26, 1983) (statement of Rep-
resentative Vincent).
115. Id.
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A primary concern of many of the legislators was the added
burden that the taxpayer would bear as a result of mandatory sen-
tencing. In particular, the problem of jail overcrowding would have
to be addressed by local governments.1 ' There was general agree-
ment among the legislators that some form of mandatory jail time
legislation should be passed. The contentious issue was how and
when the jail sentence was to be served. The twenty-four hour
term for a first conviction of DUI received little opposition. After
considerable debate, 1 7 a compromise position was reached that re-
quires a person convicted of a second or third DUI offense within
five years of a prior conviction to serve at least forty-eight consecu-
tive hours of jail time." 8
Mandatory sentencing received guarded approval from mem-
bers of the judiciary." 9 There were expressions by some judges
116. Representative Brown was concerned that judges would be reluctant to send of-
fenders to jail due to overcrowding. Representative Farris observed that a bond issue for the
building of a new jail in Great Falls had failed. "There comes a time when the property
owner says no." Hearings H.B. 250 Before House, supra note 2 (Jan. 26, 1983). Representa-
tive Addy commented that the Billings jail was so overcrowded that judges were no longer
sentencing people to jail because they would not be let in. Id. (Feb. 16, 1983). Chairman
Brown expressed the view that bills like mandatory sentencing totally ignore the adminis-
trative burden put on local governments and place the local government in an impossible
position. Id. Representative Vincent acknowledged the existence of this problem, but he
expressed the view that the solution was not simply to let the guilty go free. Representative
Vincent conceded, though, that the choice to expend the necessary funds would ultimately
rest with the local taxpayer. Id. (Jan. 26, 1983). Representative Vincent indicated the Legis-
lature might have to help out local governments. Doris Fisher, MADD, observed that "al-
though the jails are full, so are the hospitals and the cemeteries." Id. Representatives
Keyser and Hannah stated that it was the responsibility of the counties to face up to the
problems they are having with their jails. Id. (Feb. 16, 1983). The concerns of the legislators
were well founded. According to a United States Department of Justice study, mandatory
sentencing for drunk drivers places a great strain on correctional facilities, especially during
the weekends. Cimons, Tougher DUI Laws Cause Jail Crowds, New Study Claims, Missou-
lian, Nov. 11, 1984, at 2, col. 2. The study suggested that convicted offenders be required to
help pay the costs of their confinement to ease the financial burden on local governments.
Id.
117. The protest that emerged was not to the length of the sentences but to the
mandatory consecutive time proposal. Some legislators expressed the view that, because
many of the persons convicted of second and third DUI's would be working people, many
would lose their jobs if they were required to serve their sentences consecutively. This result
would not only affect the offender but it would affect the offender's family. A compromise
position was reached which required that at least 48 hours of the jail term had to be served
consecutively. Representative Darko observed that she comes from a one-industry town and
if the workers are put in jail and can't work, they will be fired. Hearings H.B. 250 Before
House, supra note 2 (Feb. 16, 1983).
118. 1983 Mont. Laws ch. 433.
119. Gladys Vance, Cascade County Justice of the Peace, expressed support for
mandatory sentencing because it prevents judge shopping. She also proposed that the courts
be given the power to suspend sentences for up to six months on first and second convic-
tions of DUI. Justice Vance believed that alcohol intervention programs were not given suf-
ficient time to work. Exhibit N, Hearings H.B. 250 Before House, supra note 2 (Jan. 26,
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that the proposed bill encroached too broadly on judicial discre-
tion."20 Minimum jail terms are prescribed by the new sentencing
statute for convictions for first, second, and third offenses of
DUI.'2 1 These sentences are not subject to suspension by the judge
unless the defendant fits within the parameters of the medical es-
cape clause. This provision allows a sentencing judge to suspend
the mandatory jail term for a first or second conviction. The judge
is required to make a determination that the jail term poses a
threat to the physical or mental well-being of the defendant. ' It
was suggested that written medical verification should be required
to qualify for this exception, '2' but this proposal was not adopted.
The wording of the sentencing statute suggests that a judge could
1983).
District Court Judge Joseph B. Gary of the Eighteenth Judicial District presented the
following comments:
[I]n relation to DWI, I feel that a jail sentence could be a deterrent. If you jailed
one lawyer for a day, every lawyer in the district would know of that and the next
time the other lawyer had one too many, the thought of his colleague in jail could
certainly be a deterrent to his driving, I believe. This should permeate all seg-
ments of society, a carpenter, a fireman, a doctor, a teacher, ad infinitum ....
[This bill] will be a possible step forward in deterring continued carnage. For this
reason I advocate the passage of House Bill No. 250.
Hearings H.B. 250 Before Senate, supra note 2 (Mar. 9, 1983).
120. Myron Pitch, a city judge, opposed the legislation: "If the tools are taken away
from the judges, they will have no control over the people." Pitch was concerned that reha-
bilitation was not being considered. Hearings H.B. 250 Before House, supra note 2 (Jan. 26,
1983). Mike McCabe, a justice of the peace, opposed the bill because it didn't go far enough.
"24 hours in jail is nothing." Id. Marcel Turcotte, representing the Montana Magistrates
Association, explained that he fought the bill in the House because "it takes away the
judge's discretion in sentencing." Hearings H.B. 250 Before Senate, supra note 2. A con-
trary view was expressed by Representative Hannah. He strongly criticized the judicial atti-
tude of some judges who apparently stated they were not going to obey the law and they
were not going to put people in jail. Representative Hannah noted that the Legislature had
already killed a bill which would have chastized judges for not sentencing convicted persons
according to the criminal statutes. Hannah contended that it was the responsibility of the
Legislature to decide whether sentencing requirements should be enacted and it was then
the responsibility of the judge to sentence people according to the law. Hearings H.B. 250
Before House, supra note 2 (Feb. 16, 1983).
121. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-714(1), (2), (3) (1983). Three days of the mandatory
seven days for a second DUI conviction must be served. Ten days of the mandatory 30 days
for a third DUI conviction must be served if the offense occurred within five years of the
first offense. Id. at § 61-8-714(2), (3).
122. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-714(1), (2) (1983). The statute makes no provision for a
medical exception for a third conviction. Rather, on a third conviction, at least 10 days of
the sentence "may not be deferred or suspended." Id. at § 61-8-714(3).
123. Betty Wing suggested that the sentencing statute should be amended to provide
that the jail sentence could be dismissed only if the offender had written verification from a
licensed physician or psychologist that the offender qualified under the medical escape
clause. Ms. Wing stated the opinion that the medical clause was overused. Hearings H.B.
250 Before House, supra note 2 (Jan. 26, 1983).
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give a first or second time offender a deferred sentence. 12 4 This ju-
dicial action would clearly defeat the deterrent aspects of
mandatory sentencing envisioned by the Montana legislators.
There was disagreement among the legislators over whether a
first conviction of a per se violation should carry a mandatory sen-
tence. As introduced, there was no mandatory jail time.125 Repre-
sentative Ramirez opposed mandatory sentencing for at least a
first conviction of per se. He felt that traditional DUI and per se
are separate and distinct crimes and therefore should be treated as
such. Because a traditional DUI charge requires proof that the de-
fendant's driving ability was actually affected, Ramirez contended
that a DUI offense should have a more severe penalty than per se
where no behavioral threshold must be met.126 Representative Ra-
mirez prevailed and no mandatory sentence is required for a first
conviction of per se. 127
Due to the sentencing disparity between DUI and per se, a
degree of latitude may be exercised by the prosecution in plea bar-
gain negotiations. If chemical test results indicate a BAC of 0.10%
or greater, in many cases it would be to the advantage of both the
defense and the prosecution to enter and accept a plea of guilty to
the per se violation. 28 A prosecutor who does not have the advan-
tage of chemical test results should be wary of this plea bargain
arrangement. 29
124. The sentencing statute provides that 10 days of the sentence for a third convic-
tion of DUI "may not be deferred." Id. at § 61-8-714(3). No prohibition against deferred
sentences is specifically set out for first or second convictions. Id. at § 61-8-714(1), (2).
125. H.B. 540, 48th Leg., § 6 (introduced bill). An attempt was made to amend the bill
to provide for a 24 hour minimum sentence for a first conviction. The rationale for the
mandatory sentence was that a law enforcement officer could be put in a compromising
position if he had to choose between charging DUI or per se. Also, if no facilities for ob-
taining a chemical sample from a suspected drunk driver were available to the law enforce-
ment officer, the officer's only recourse would be to charge traditional DUI. In this circum-
stance, the defendant might be subject to jail time simply because no chemical test could be
performed. Colonel Robert Landon, Montana Highway Patrol, contended that discretion to
charge DUI or per se should be on the county attorney or the judge, not on the officer.
Hearings H.B. 540 Before House, supra note 2 (Apr. 5, 1983).
126. Hearings H.B. 250 Before House, supra note 2 (Feb. 17, 1983). Representative
Ramirez observed that if the penalties for DUI and per se were the same, there would be no
incentive to prosecute for DUI whenever a chemical test is performed. Id.
127. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-722(1) (1983). Mandatory jail terms are provided for
second (not less than 48 hours or more than 30 days) and third (not less than 48 hours or
more than six months) convictions of per se. Id. at § 61-8-722(2), (3).
128. The prosecution is relieved of the administrative burden of prosecuting the case
and the defendant would not necessarily have to serve any jail time.
129. If no chemical test results are available and the DUI charge has been dismissed,
the defendant may renege on the bargain and plead innocent to the per se charge. The
prosecution then would have no evidence to proceed and would have to dismiss the per se
charge.
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A defendant who has been convicted of either per se or DUI
must complete an alcohol information course in addition to any
other sentence imposed. 30 Unlike the civil administrative proce-
dure of driver's license suspension or revocation, 131 DUI and per se
convictions cannot be combined to increase the penalty, i.e., a per
se conviction and a DUI conviction within five years is not two
DUI convictions for purposes of sentencing."3 ' DUI and per se con-
victions cumulate the same number of points toward an adjudica-
tion of habitual traffic offender.1 33
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no easy solution to the problem of drinking and driv-
ing. Because there has been a long history of societal tolerance of
this problem, effective change will be slow. Spurred by federal
monetary incentives and pressure from state agencies and con-
cerned citizen groups, the 1983 Montana Legislature passed major
revisions to Montana's DUI laws. This legislative reaction to the
drinking driver, however, should be viewed only as a starting point
in the battle to rid Montana's roadways of the menace of the in-
toxicated vehicle operator. The executive and judicial branches of
state and local government now must be willing to follow the lead
of this legislative mandate. A commitment to a long range compre-
hensive approach, combining education and treatment with en-
forcement and prosecution, is the type of positive response the
1983 Montana Legislature envisioned to deal with the alcohol im-
paired driver.
A suggested procedure, in this situation, is to require the defendant to complete an
affidavit in which he admits to the amount of alcohol consumed in a particular time period.
Also, the defendant would admit that his ability to safely operate a motor vehicle was im-
paired by his consumption of alcohol. Finally, the defendant would admit that he believed
he was under the influence of alcohol. With this affidavit in hand, the prosecutor could
dismiss the DUI charge and settle for a per se guilty plea.
130. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8-714(4), -722(5) (1983).
131. There appears to be a conflict in the Montana codes on what effect a DUI or per
se conviction will have on the offender's driver's license. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-5-205 (1983)
provides that the motor vehicle division "shall revoke the license . . . of any operator ... "
who has been convicted of DUI or per se. Id. (emphasis added); id. at § 61-5-205(2). MONT.
CODE ANN. § 61-11-101(2) (1983) allows the motor vehicle division to "issue a restricted
probationary license in lieu of the suspension required in 61-5-208(2)." Id. To fall within
this provision, the court which had jurisdiction of the DUI or per se charge must recom-
mend the issuance of the license and the offender must attend a driver improvement or
alcohol treatment school. Id.
132. This is consistent with the rationale that DUI and per se are separate and dis-
tinct offenses.
133. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-11-203(2)(d) (1983).
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